Do Elections lead to Informed Public Decisions?

Arbeitspapier

Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate politicians, yet politicians who are overly interested in re-election shy away from policy examination. Our analysis sheds light on the distance created in mature democracies between the political process and the production of policy relevant information; on the role played by probing into candidates' past; and on the possibility of crowding out desirable political behaviour by increasing the value of holding office.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 03-067/1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Democracy ; Media ; Policy Examination ; Multiple Tasks ; Information ; Elections ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Wahl ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Swank, Otto H. ; Visser, Bauke
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85912
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET