Arbeitspapier
On the Optimality of Decisions
Most monetary policy committees decide on interest rates using a simple majority voting rule. Given the inherent heterogeneity of committee members, this voting rule is suboptimal in terms of the quality of the interest rate decision, but popular for other (political) reasons. We show that a clustering of committee members into 2 subgroups, as is the case in a hub-and spokes systems of central banks such as the Fed or the ESCB, can eliminate this suboptimality whilst retaining the majority voting rule.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-120/2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Thema
-
central banks' policies
decision-making under uncertainty
committees
decision-making processes
Zentralbank
Zinspolitik
Entscheidung
Abstimmungsregel
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Berk, Jan Marc
Bierut, Beata
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Berk, Jan Marc
- Bierut, Beata
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2004