Arbeitspapier

Social Preferences in Private Decisions

Social preference models were originally constructed to explain two things: why people spend money to affect the earnings of others and why the income of others influences reported happiness. We test these models in a novel experimental situation where participants face a risky decision that affects only their own earnings. In the social (individual) treatment participants do (not) observe the earnings of others. In the social treatment gambles therefore not only affect absolute but also relative earnings. Outcome-based social preference models therefore predict a treatment difference. We find that decisions are generally the same in both treatments, in line with rule-based social preference models, like procedural fairness.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 12-003/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Thema
fairness
social preferences
decision making under risk
experiment
Entscheidung bei Risiko
Glücksspiel
Risikoaversion
Soziales Verhalten
Test
Amsterdam

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Linde, Jona
Sonnemans, Joep
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Linde, Jona
  • Sonnemans, Joep
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2012

Ähnliche Objekte (12)