Arbeitspapier
Why do Policy Makers stick to Inefficient Decisions?
This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal policy maker's decision on continuation of a policy, assuming that voters' beliefs about the policy maker's competence are updated according to Bayes' rule. I show that if the policy maker cares sufficiently about reelection, he will never repeal a policy.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 99-050/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Politik
Entscheidung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dur, Robert A.J.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dur, Robert A.J.
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 1999
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