Absolute vs. relative success: Why overconfidence is an inefficient equilibrium
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; 0700
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Heidelberg
- (wer)
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Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
- (wann)
-
2021
- Urheber
- DOI
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10.11588/heidok.00029513
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-295132
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:57 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Soldà, Alice
- Ke, Changxia
- Hippel, William von
- Page, Lionel
- Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
Entstanden
- 2021
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