Arbeitspapier

Persistent Inefficient Redistribution

Why do governments redistribute through indirect and inefficient means? An intuitive hypothesis is that it masks the real aim and cost of policy. In this paper we construct a dynamic model with an infinite horizon, political competition, rational individuals and asymmetric information regarding the efficiency of policy and politicians' preferences to test this hypothesis. While the previous (formal) literature explains one-time projects like the building of a dam, bridge or an airport, we are able to explain the persistent use of inefficient means like regulation and subsidies for redistributive purposes.

ISBN
82-7553-202-7
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002/11

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
political economy
inefficient redistribution
reform
special interests

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Claussen, Carl Andreas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Norges Bank
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Claussen, Carl Andreas
  • Norges Bank

Entstanden

  • 2002

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