Arbeitspapier

Persistent Inefficient Redistribution

Why do governments redistribute through indirect and inefficient means? An intuitive hypothesis is that it masks the real aim and cost of policy. In this paper we construct a dynamic model with an infinite horizon, political competition, rational individuals and asymmetric information regarding the efficiency of policy and politicians' preferences to test this hypothesis. While the previous (formal) literature explains one-time projects like the building of a dam, bridge or an airport, we are able to explain the persistent use of inefficient means like regulation and subsidies for redistributive purposes.

ISBN
82-7553-202-7
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002/11

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Subject
political economy
inefficient redistribution
reform
special interests

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Claussen, Carl Andreas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Norges Bank
(where)
Oslo
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Claussen, Carl Andreas
  • Norges Bank

Time of origin

  • 2002

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