Arbeitspapier
Persistent Inefficient Redistribution
Why do governments redistribute through indirect and inefficient means? An intuitive hypothesis is that it masks the real aim and cost of policy. In this paper we construct a dynamic model with an infinite horizon, political competition, rational individuals and asymmetric information regarding the efficiency of policy and politicians' preferences to test this hypothesis. While the previous (formal) literature explains one-time projects like the building of a dam, bridge or an airport, we are able to explain the persistent use of inefficient means like regulation and subsidies for redistributive purposes.
- ISBN
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82-7553-202-7
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002/11
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Subject
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political economy
inefficient redistribution
reform
special interests
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Claussen, Carl Andreas
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Norges Bank
- (where)
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Oslo
- (when)
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2002
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Claussen, Carl Andreas
- Norges Bank
Time of origin
- 2002