Arbeitspapier
Inefficient School Choice in a Long-Run Urban Equilibrium
We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed mechanisms, the deferred acceptance and the Boston algorithm, both produce inefficient outcomes and that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than deferred acceptance. This advantage vanishes if the participants get to know their priorities before they submit their preferences. Moreover, the mechanism creates artificial social segregation at the cost of the disadvantaged if the school priorities are based on ex ante known (social) differences of the applicants.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4969
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Publicly Provided Private Goods
Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics
- Thema
-
school choice
deffered acceptance
Boston mechanism
Tiebout-hypothesis
social seggregation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kamecke, Ulrich
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kamecke, Ulrich
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014
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