Equilibrium at a Bottleneck when Long-Run and Short-Run Scheduling Preferences diverge

Arbeitspapier

We consider equilibrium and optimum use of a Vickrey road bottleneck, distinguishing between long-run and short-run scheduling preferences in an otherwise stylized scheduling model. The preference structure reflects that there is a distinction between the (exogenous) 'long-run preferred arrival time', which would be relevant if consumers were unconstrained in the scheduling of their activities, versus the 'short-run preferred arrival time', which is the result of an adaptation of travel routines in the face of constraints caused by, in particular, time-varying congestion levels. We characterize the unpriced equilibrium, the social optimum as well as second-best situations where the availability of the pricing instruments is restricted. All of them imply a dispersed distribution of short-run preferred arrival times. The extent of dispersion in the unpriced equilibrium, however, is higher than socially optimal.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-028/VIII

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy ; Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
• Thema: bottleneck model ; scheduling decisions ; travel routines ; long-run vs. short-run ; Bottleneck ; Gleichgewicht ; Scheduling-Verfahren ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Peer, Stefanie ; Verhoef, Erik T.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87552
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ