Arbeitspapier

The Elimination of Broker Voting in Director Elections

After pressure from shareholder activists, proxy advisory firms, and the New York Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission has eliminated uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We observe that average director approval rates remain high after the change in regulation, while the probability of a director being voted off the board remains low. In addition, we find no evidence of significant wealth effects of the change in regulation. We do find that firms are increasingly letting shareholders ratify their auditors after the change in regulation, which helps in establishing a quorum.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 12-094/IV/DSF38

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Broker voting
shareholder empowerment
Securities and Exchange Commission
board effectiveness
Board of Directors
Shareholder Value
Finanzmarktaufsicht
USA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Akyol, Ali
Raff, Konrad
Verwijmeren, Patrick
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Akyol, Ali
  • Raff, Konrad
  • Verwijmeren, Patrick
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2012

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