The Elimination of Broker Voting in Director Elections

Arbeitspapier

After pressure from shareholder activists, proxy advisory firms, and the New York Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission has eliminated uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We observe that average director approval rates remain high after the change in regulation, while the probability of a director being voted off the board remains low. In addition, we find no evidence of significant wealth effects of the change in regulation. We do find that firms are increasingly letting shareholders ratify their auditors after the change in regulation, which helps in establishing a quorum.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 12-094/IV/DSF38

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance ; Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
• Subject: Broker voting ; shareholder empowerment ; Securities and Exchange Commission ; board effectiveness ; Board of Directors ; Shareholder Value ; Finanzmarktaufsicht ; USA

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Akyol, Ali ; Raff, Konrad ; Verwijmeren, Patrick
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87320
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET