Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections

Abstract: Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions. In these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. We analyse municipal elections in Flanders during the period 1982-2000 and find empirical evidence for yardstick voting. Incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Importantly, the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. Higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch
Anmerkungen
Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Applied Economics ; 38 (2006) 19 ; 2285-2298

Klassifikation
Politik

Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2006
Urheber
Vermeir, Jan
Heyndels, Bruno

DOI
10.1080/00036840500427536
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-239238
Rechteinformation
Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
14.08.2025, 10:57 MESZ

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Beteiligte

  • Vermeir, Jan
  • Heyndels, Bruno

Entstanden

  • 2006

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