Monografie
Improving welfare by seeking rents - or: on the ambivalence of rent seeking for explaining constitutional change
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Umfang
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17, [6] Bl.
- Identifier
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95804001X
- Reihe
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Discussion paper / Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems; 99,12
Thema
Rent Seeking; Ökonomische Theorie der Verfassung; Verfassungsreform; Institutionalismus; Wohlfahrtseffekt
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf Teile des Objekts ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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16.08.2023, 18:24 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
Beteiligte
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