Arbeitspapier

Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence

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This paper studies the factors driving changes in judicial independence (JI) as incorporated in constitutions. Two indicators of constitutionally safeguarded JI are constructed. Variations in these indicators are identified based on changes in the constitutions of as many as 100 countries that occurred between 1950 and 2005. Four groups of factors are conjectured to be relevant for explaining these changes. We find only weak evidence for the insurance theory of judicial independence but strong evidence that the characteristics of individual leaders - such as how they acquired or lost power - play an important role in explaining changes in constitutionally safeguarded JI. This paper contributes not only to the literature on JI but also to the theory of endogenous constitutions.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 49-2012

Classification: Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

Subject: judicial independence
constitutional change
endogenous constitutions
relevance of leaders
Justiz
Selbstverwaltung
Verfassungsreform
Macht
Welt

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Hayo, Bernd
Voigt, Stefan

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

(where): Marburg

(when): 2012

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73053

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Hayo, Bernd
Voigt, Stefan
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Time of origin

2012

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