Arbeitspapier
Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of governments?
A country's form of government has important economic and political consequences, but the determinants that lead countries to choose either parliamentary or presidential systems are largely unexplored. This paper studies this choice by analyzing the factors that make countries switch from parliamentary to presidential systems (or vice versa). The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we identify the survival probability of the existing form of government (drawing on a proportional hazard model). In our model, which is based on 169 countries, we find that geographical factors and former colonial status are important determinants of survival probability. Also, presidential systems are, ceteris paribus, more likely to survive than parliamentary ones. Second, given that a change has taken place, we identify the underlying reasons based on panel data logit models. We find that domestic political factors are more important than economic ones. The most important factors relate to intermediate internal armed conflict, sectarian political participation, degree of democratization, and party competition, as well as the extent to which knowledge resources are distributed among the members of society.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3087
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- Thema
-
constitutional change
institutional dynamics
form of government
endogenous constitutions
separation of powers
Verfassungsreform
Politische Reform
Staatsoberhaupt
Parlamentarismus
Gewaltenteilung
Institutioneller Wandel
Public Choice
Welt
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hayo, Bernd
Voigt, Stefan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hayo, Bernd
- Voigt, Stefan
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2010
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