Arbeitspapier
Explaining de facto judicial independence
A high degree of de facto judicial Independence (JI) functions as a crucial precondition of governments to credibly commit to legislative decisions, such as respecting private property rights. Thus, de facto JI should improve the allocative efficiency and may therefore contribute positively to economic growth. But JI as formally written down in legal texts is an imperfect predictor for de facto JI. This paper tries to identify the forces which determine de facto JI. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short run and those that are the result of historical development and that are exempt from short-term modification is made. Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables promises to be policy-relevant. A rigorous empirical model reduction process is used in order to cope with the potential excess of explanatory variables. The explanatory variables for de facto JI that survive the reduction process are de jure JI, legal confidence of the public, extent of democratization, degree of press freedom, and the religious beliefs of the population.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Marburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge ; No. 2005,07
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Subject
-
Judicial independence
informal institutions
formal institutions
Gerichtsbarkeit
Gewaltenteilung
Sozialer Indikator
Schätzung
Welt
Gerichtsbarkeit
Gewaltenteilung
Sozialer Indikator
Schätzung
Welt
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hayo, Bernd
Voigt, Stefan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Philipps-Universität Marburg, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
- (where)
-
Marburg
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hayo, Bernd
- Voigt, Stefan
- Philipps-Universität Marburg, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Time of origin
- 2005
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Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?
Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?
Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure?
The Puzzling Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence
The puzzling long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence
Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence
Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey
Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence
Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey
The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth
The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth
Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don't
Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?