Arbeitspapier
Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don't
We study changes in the form of government as an example of endogenously determined constitutions. For a sample of 202 countries over the period 1950-2006, we find that most changes are relatively small and roughly equally likely to be either in the direction of more parliamentarian or more presidential systems. Based on a fixed effects ordered logit panel data model estimated over the period 1951-2000 for 146 countries, we find that such changes in the constitution can be explained by characteristics of the political system, internal and external political conflicts, and political leaders, whereas economic and socio-demographic variables do not matter.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 27-2010
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- Subject
-
constitutional change
form of government
endogenous constitutions
separation of powers
relevance of leaders
Verfassungsreform
Politisches System
Gewaltenteilung
Politiker
Schätzung
Welt
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hayo, Bernd
Voigt, Stefan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
- (where)
-
Marburg
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hayo, Bernd
- Voigt, Stefan
- Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Time of origin
- 2010
Other Objects (12)
Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t
Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey
Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure?
Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?
Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?
Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey
Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence
The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth
Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of governments?
The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth
The Puzzling Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence
The puzzling long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence
Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t
Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey
Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure?
Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?
Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?
Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey
Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence
The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth
Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of governments?
The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth
The Puzzling Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence
The puzzling long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence
Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t
Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey
Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure?
Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?
Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?
Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey
Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence
The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth
Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of governments?
The relevance of judicial procedure for economic growth
The Puzzling Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence