Arbeitspapier
Structural remedies as a signalling device
We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the Antitrust Agency (AA) cannot observe a proposed merger's efficiency type. Provided the AA follows a consumer surplus standard, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture proposal in a pooling equilibrium, which is also possible under separation.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86304-208-0
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 209
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Antitrust Law
- Subject
-
Remedies
Divestiture
Merger Control
Signalling
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Wey, Christian
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (where)
-
Düsseldorf
- (when)
-
2016
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
- Wey, Christian
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Time of origin
- 2016
Other Objects (12)
Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
The effects of remedies on merger activity in oligopoly
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
The Effects of Remedies on Merger Activity in Oligopoly
Evidence production in merger control: The role of remedies
Merger remedies in oligopoly under a consumer welfare standard
Structural Remedies as a Signalling Device
Neue Mindestlohngesetze vernichten Gewerkschaftskonkurrenz: Kommentar
Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb
Flächentarifsystem fördert Innovationswettbewerb
Nicht Abwracken, sondern Ideen fördern: Kommentar
Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
The effects of remedies on merger activity in oligopoly
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
The Effects of Remedies on Merger Activity in Oligopoly
Evidence production in merger control: The role of remedies
Merger remedies in oligopoly under a consumer welfare standard
Structural Remedies as a Signalling Device
Neue Mindestlohngesetze vernichten Gewerkschaftskonkurrenz: Kommentar
Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb
Flächentarifsystem fördert Innovationswettbewerb
Nicht Abwracken, sondern Ideen fördern: Kommentar
Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
The effects of remedies on merger activity in oligopoly
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
The Effects of Remedies on Merger Activity in Oligopoly
Evidence production in merger control: The role of remedies
Merger remedies in oligopoly under a consumer welfare standard
Structural Remedies as a Signalling Device
Neue Mindestlohngesetze vernichten Gewerkschaftskonkurrenz: Kommentar
Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb
Flächentarifsystem fördert Innovationswettbewerb