Arbeitspapier
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8915
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Antitrust Law
- Subject
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merger remedies
merger control
antitrust
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Wey, Christian
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2021
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
- Wey, Christian
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2021
Other Objects (12)
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
Evidence production in merger control: The role of remedies
Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control
The effects of remedies on merger activity in oligopoly
The Effects of Remedies on Merger Activity in Oligopoly
Merger remedies in oligopoly under a consumer welfare standard
Uncertain merger synergies, passive partial ownership, and merger control
Merger control in the new economy
Merger control in the new economy
Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeover, and merger control
Structural remedies as a signalling device
Neue Mindestlohngesetze vernichten Gewerkschaftskonkurrenz: Kommentar
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
Evidence production in merger control: The role of remedies
Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control
The effects of remedies on merger activity in oligopoly
The Effects of Remedies on Merger Activity in Oligopoly
Merger remedies in oligopoly under a consumer welfare standard
Uncertain merger synergies, passive partial ownership, and merger control
Merger control in the new economy
Merger control in the new economy
Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeover, and merger control
Structural remedies as a signalling device
Neue Mindestlohngesetze vernichten Gewerkschaftskonkurrenz: Kommentar
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
Evidence production in merger control: The role of remedies
Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control
The effects of remedies on merger activity in oligopoly
The Effects of Remedies on Merger Activity in Oligopoly
Merger remedies in oligopoly under a consumer welfare standard
Uncertain merger synergies, passive partial ownership, and merger control
Merger control in the new economy
Merger control in the new economy
Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeover, and merger control
Structural remedies as a signalling device