The effects of remedies on merger activity in oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. Remedies increase the scope for pro…table and acceptable mergers, while divestitures to an entrant …rm are most effective in this regard. Remedial divestitures are most attractive from a social welfare point of view, when the merging parties can extract the entire gains associated with the asset sale. We also show that the merging parties have strong incentives to search for the most efficient buyer. Finally, we identify instances so that a remedy rule induces strictly price-decreasing mergers.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-080-2
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 81

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Antitrust Law
• Thema: Remedies ; Divestiture ; Merger Control ; Oligopoly ; Synergies

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus ; Wey, Christian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (wo): Düsseldorf
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68228
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ