Artikel
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency's incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Review of Industrial Organization ; ISSN: 1573-7160 ; Volume: 59 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-12 ; New York, NY: Springer US
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Antitrust Law
- Subject
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Merger remedies
Merger control
Antitrust
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Wey, Christian
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Springer US
- (where)
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New York, NY
- (when)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s11151-021-09813-2
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
- Wey, Christian
- Springer US
Time of origin
- 2021