Artikel

Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies

We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency's incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Review of Industrial Organization ; ISSN: 1573-7160 ; Volume: 59 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-12 ; New York, NY: Springer US

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Antitrust Law
Subject
Merger remedies
Merger control
Antitrust

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Wey, Christian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Springer US
(where)
New York, NY
(when)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1007/s11151-021-09813-2
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
  • Wey, Christian
  • Springer US

Time of origin

  • 2021

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