Arbeitspapier
Structural remedies as a signalling device
We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the Antitrust Agency (AA) cannot observe a proposed merger's efficiency type. Provided the AA follows a consumer surplus standard, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture proposal in a pooling equilibrium, which is also possible under separation.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86304-208-0
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 209
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Antitrust Law
- Thema
-
Remedies
Divestiture
Merger Control
Signalling
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Wey, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
- Wey, Christian
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2016
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