Exclusive contracts and bargaining power

Arbeitspapier

This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new up-stream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 978

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: Antitrust policy ; Entry deterrence ; Exclusive contracts ; Nash bargaining

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kitamura, Hiroshi ; Matsushima, Noriaki ; Sato, Misato
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148205
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET