Collective bargaining under non-binding contracts

Arbeitspapier

We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5518

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects ; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
• Subject: collective bargaining ; union ; firm ; bargaining power ; non-binding contract ; Lohnverhandlungen ; Verhandlungsmacht ; Kooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dobbelaere, Sabien ; Luttens, Roland Iwan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51942
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201104113917
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET