Arbeitspapier
Exclusive contracts and bargaining power
This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new up-stream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 978
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Antitrust policy
Entry deterrence
Exclusive contracts
Nash bargaining
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kitamura, Hiroshi
Matsushima, Noriaki
Sato, Misato
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kitamura, Hiroshi
- Matsushima, Noriaki
- Sato, Misato
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2016
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