Bargaining and Power

Arbeitspapier

Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power configuration which is stable with respect to renegotiations. We further show that given this power configuration there is a coalition which is both internally and Nash stable. We consider two different bargaining solutions on apex games and show under which conditions there are core stable coalitions. Finally, we investigate how infeasible coalition might affect the outcome and apply our model to the German parliament.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 63.2013

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Thema: Coalition Formation ; Power ; Bargaining

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Karos, Dominik
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89612
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ