Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption

Arbeitspapier

We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1448

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Externalities ; General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General ; Household Behavior: General
• Subject: household behavior ; bargaining power ; local and global changes ; price effects ; general equilibrium ; Haushaltsökonomik ; Konsumtheorie ; Verhandlungsmacht ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gersbach, Hans ; Haller, Hans
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18812