Arbeitspapier

Deposit Insurance in General Equilibrium

We study the consequences and optimal design of bank deposit insurance in a general equilibrium model. The model involves two production sectors. One sector is financed by issuing bonds to risk-averse households. Firms in the other sector are monitored and financed by banks. Households fund banks through deposits and equity. Deposits are explicitly insured by a de- posit insurance fund. Any remaining shortfall is implicitly guaranteed by the government. The deposit insurance fund charges banks a premium per unit of deposits whereas the government finances any necessary bail-outs by lump-sum taxation of households. When the deposit insurance premium is actuarially fair or higher than actuarially fair, two types of equilibria emerge: One type of equilibria supports the socially optimal (Arrow-Debreu) allo- cation, and the other type does not. In the latter case, bank lending is too large relative to equity and the probability that the banking system collapses is positive. Next, we show that a judicious combination of deposit insurance and reinsurance eliminates all non-optimal equilibrium allocations.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 16/258

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Financial Markets
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Thema
Financial intermediation
deposit insurance
capital structure
general equilibrium
reinsurance
Finanzintermediation
Einlagensicherung
Kapitalstruktur
Rückversicherung
Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gersbach, Hans
Britz, Volker
Haller, Hans
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010711413
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Britz, Volker
  • Haller, Hans
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Entstanden

  • 2016

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