Arbeitspapier
When Inefficiency Begets Efficiency
Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact on market performance depends on whether household inefficiencies are caused by inefficient net trades with the market or by inefficient distribution of resources within households. Inefficient internal distribution always results in inefficient equilibrium allocations. This leads us to consider competitive forces as a disciplinary device for households. Competition of households for both resources and members can eliminate or reduce inefficient internal distribution.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1197
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gersbach, Hans
Haller, Hans
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gersbach, Hans
- Haller, Hans
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2004
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