Arbeitspapier
Matching on Bipartite Graphs
We study stable matchings on exogenously given or endogenously formed bipartite graphs that reflect constraints on matching. The effects of a change of the exogenously given graph (constraints) are investigated. Specifically, we examine to what extent individuals gain or lose from relaxing restrictions on matching. Sabotage of particular matches or location choice can render certain matches infeasible and, therefore, lead to endogenous constraints.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5575
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Thema
-
matching theory
networks
graphs
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gersbach, Hans
Haller, Hans
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gersbach, Hans
- Haller, Hans
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2015
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