- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0005
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Vertragstheorie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Segal, Ilya R.
Whinston, Michael D.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
- (where)
-
Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Segal, Ilya R.
- Whinston, Michael D.
- Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
Time of origin
- 2000
Other Objects (12)
Exclusive contracts and bargaining power
Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion
Competition with Exclusive Contracts in Vertically Related Markets: An Equilibrium Non-Existence Result
Improving investment coordination in electricity networks through smart contracts
Repayment versus investment conditions and exclusivity in lending contracts
Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts
Incentive Contracts for Managers Who Discover and Manage Investment Projects
Limited Liability and Option Contracts in Models with Sequential Investments
Employment protection, temporary contracts and firm-provided training: Evidence from Italy
Exclusive contracts and bargaining power
Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion
Competition with Exclusive Contracts in Vertically Related Markets: An Equilibrium Non-Existence Result
Improving investment coordination in electricity networks through smart contracts
Repayment versus investment conditions and exclusivity in lending contracts
Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts
Incentive Contracts for Managers Who Discover and Manage Investment Projects
Limited Liability and Option Contracts in Models with Sequential Investments
Employment protection, temporary contracts and firm-provided training: Evidence from Italy
Exclusive contracts and bargaining power
Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion
Competition with Exclusive Contracts in Vertically Related Markets: An Equilibrium Non-Existence Result
Improving investment coordination in electricity networks through smart contracts
Repayment versus investment conditions and exclusivity in lending contracts
Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts
Incentive Contracts for Managers Who Discover and Manage Investment Projects
Limited Liability and Option Contracts in Models with Sequential Investments