Arbeitspapier
Competition with Exclusive Contracts in Vertically Related Markets: An Equilibrium Non-Existence Result
I develop a model in the spirit of Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), in which two upstream firms compete to supply a homogeneous input to two downstream firms, who compete in prices with differentiated products in a downstream market. Upstream firms are allowed to offer exclusive two-part tariff contracts to the downstream firms. I show that, under very general conditions, this game does not have a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. The intuition is that variable parts in such an equilibrium would have to be pairwise-proof. But when variable parts are pairwise-proof, downstream competitive externalities are not internalized, and there exists a profitable deviation. I contrast this non-existence result with earlier papers that found equilibria in similar models.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 439
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schutz, Nicolas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
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München
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
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doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17398
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17398-5
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schutz, Nicolas
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2013