Comments : Kommentar zu: Sunk Costs, Managerial Incentives and Firm Productivity

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Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Comments : Kommentar zu: Sunk Costs, Managerial Incentives and Firm Productivity ; volume:70 ; number:2
Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung ; 70, Heft 2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Urheber
Smith, Valdemar

DOI
10.3790/vjh.70.2.288
Handle
10419/99203
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201802286670
Rechteinformation
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Letzte Aktualisierung
14.08.2025, 10:56 MESZ

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  • Smith, Valdemar

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