Artikel
Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller can simultaneously and privately trade with several buyers. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Aggregate equilibrium trades are unique. Any traded contract must yield zero profit. If a quality is actually traded, then it is efficiently traded. Depending on parameters, both qualities may be traded, or only one of them, or the market may break down to a no-trade equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-40 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
-
Adverse selection
competing mechanisms
nonexclusivity
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mariotti, Thomas
Salanié, François
Attar, Andrea
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2014
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE1126
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Mariotti, Thomas
- Salanié, François
- Attar, Andrea
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2014
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