Artikel
Adverse Selection, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and Evolutionary Learning
We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about the distribution of agents' types in the population. The resulting nonlinear dynamic system is studied. Convergence to a uniform belief depends on the relative size of the bias in beliefs.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Dynamic Games and Applications ; ISSN: 2153-0793 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 343-362 ; New York, NY: Springer US
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- Thema
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Evolutionary game theory
Imitation equilibrium
Heterogeneous beliefs
Adverse selection
Cobweb model
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Buchen, Clemens
Palermo, Alberto
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Springer US
- (wo)
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New York, NY
- (wann)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s13235-021-00396-x
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Buchen, Clemens
- Palermo, Alberto
- Springer US
Entstanden
- 2021