Artikel

Adverse Selection, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and Evolutionary Learning

We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about the distribution of agents' types in the population. The resulting nonlinear dynamic system is studied. Convergence to a uniform belief depends on the relative size of the bias in beliefs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Dynamic Games and Applications ; ISSN: 2153-0793 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 343-362 ; New York, NY: Springer US

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Thema
Evolutionary game theory
Imitation equilibrium
Heterogeneous beliefs
Adverse selection
Cobweb model

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Buchen, Clemens
Palermo, Alberto
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Springer US
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1007/s13235-021-00396-x
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Buchen, Clemens
  • Palermo, Alberto
  • Springer US

Entstanden

  • 2021

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