Artikel
Political inequality, political participation, and support for populist parties
We theoretically investigate how political abstention among certain social groups encourages populist parties to enter the political stage, trying to absorb inactive voters. We design a two-stage game with two established parties and n voters who jointly determine a taxation policy. The electorate is divided into two groups, the advantaged and the disadvantaged. Voters' decisions on whether to participate depend on a party's tax rate proposal and on general party ideology. Effective political participation requires a certain amount of financial, social and intellectual resources to, for example, evaluate party programs or to engage in political discussion. As the disadvantaged are endowed with fewer resources, they lack political efficacy, resulting in less political participation. Consequently, the established parties propose a tax rate which is biased towards the preferences of the advantaged. The unused voter potential among the disadvantaged draws the interest of a populist challenger. To win support from the disadvantaged, the challenger party optimally proposes a respectively biased tax rate, which then works to polarize the political spectrum.Please confirm if the author names are presented accurately and in the correct sequence (given name, middle name/initial, family name). Author 1 Given name: [Kim Leonie] Last name [ Kellermann]. Also, kindly confirm the details in the metadata are correct.All correct.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Constitutional Political Economy ; ISSN: 1572-9966 ; Volume: 33 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 461-482 ; New York, NY: Springer US
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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Populist parties
Political participation
Political inequality
Probabilistic voting
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kellermann, Kim Leonie
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Springer US
- (where)
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New York, NY
- (when)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s10602-021-09357-3
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Kellermann, Kim Leonie
- Springer US
Time of origin
- 2021