Artikel

Optimal contracting under adverse selection: The implications of mentalizing

We study a model of adverse selection, hard and soft information, and mentalizing ability-the human capacity to represent others' intentions, knowledge, and beliefs. By allowing for a continuous range of different information types, as well as for different means of acquiring information, we develop a model that captures how principals differentially obtain information on agents. We show that principals that combine conventional data collection techniques with mentalizing benefit from a synergistic effect that impacts both the amount of information that is accessed and the overall cost of that information. This strategy affects the properties of the optimal contract, which grows closer to the first best. This research provides insights into the implications of mentalizing for agency theory.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Contemporary Economics ; ISSN: 2084-0845 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 215-231 ; Warsaw: Vizja Press & IT

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Adverse selection
mentalizing
hard information
soft information
contract

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lenells, Jonatan
Stea, Diego
Foss, Nicolai J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Vizja Press & IT
(wo)
Warsaw
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.5709/ce.1897-9254.168
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Lenells, Jonatan
  • Stea, Diego
  • Foss, Nicolai J.
  • Vizja Press & IT

Entstanden

  • 2015

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