Artikel
Information sharing and lending market competition under strong adverse selection
In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77-99, 2007) show that information sharing increases banks' profits to the detriment of creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case in which adverse selection is not too strong.We analyze the complementary case and show that, when the economy suffers from strong adverse selection, information sharing still increases banks' profits, but it may or may not hurt talented entrepreneurs.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 235-245 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
information sharing
lending relationships
poaching
equilibrium switching
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fernández-Ruiz, Jorge
García-Cestona, Miguel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Springer
- (wo)
-
Heidelberg
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.1007/s13209-012-0090-y
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Fernández-Ruiz, Jorge
- García-Cestona, Miguel
- Springer
Entstanden
- 2013
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