Arbeitspapier
The impact of monitoring in infinitely repeated games: Perfect, public, and private
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We find that the subjects sustain cooperation in every treatment, but that their strategies differ substantially in the three treatments. Specifically, we observe that the strategies are more complex under public and private monitoring than under perfect monitoring. We also find that the strategies under private monitoring are more lenient than under perfect monitoring, and less forgiving than under public monitoring.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 942
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Thema
-
infinitely repeated games
monitoring
perfect
public
private
experiments
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Aoyagi, Masaki
Bhaskar, V.
Frechette, Guillaume R.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Aoyagi, Masaki
- Bhaskar, V.
- Frechette, Guillaume R.
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2015
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