Arbeitspapier
A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games
Let Gamma be a game in extensive form and G be its reduced normal form game. Let Gamma ^infinity (delta) and G^infinity (delta) be the infinitely repeated game version of Gamma and G respectively, with common discount factor delta. This note points out that the set of SPE payoff vectors of Gamma^infinity (delta) might be different from that of G sub infinity (delta), even when delta is arbitrarily close to 1. This difference can be substantial when G fails to satisfy the "dimensionality" condition (a-la Fundenberg and Masking (1986) or Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1992)).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 989
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Rubinstein, Ariel
Wolinsky, Asher
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1992
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Rubinstein, Ariel
- Wolinsky, Asher
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1992
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