Arbeitspapier
Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems
Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness in a class of such games, namely infinitely repeated decision problems with discounting. The condition is two-fold: the range of possible utility levels in the decision problem should be bounded from below, and the discount factor between successive periods should be non-decreasing over time, a condition met by exponential, quasi-exponential and hyperbolic discounting.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 577
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
- Thema
-
Game Theory
Time Preference
Hyperbolic Discounting
Repeated Decision Problems
Spieltheorie
Zeitpräferenz
Entscheidungstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vieille, Nicolas
Weibull, Jörgen W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Vieille, Nicolas
- Weibull, Jörgen W.
- The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
Entstanden
- 2002
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