Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems

Arbeitspapier

Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness in a class of such games, namely infinitely repeated decision problems with discounting. The condition is two-fold: the range of possible utility levels in the decision problem should be bounded from below, and the discount factor between successive periods should be non-decreasing over time, a condition met by exponential, quasi-exponential and hyperbolic discounting.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 577

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
• Subject: Game Theory ; Time Preference ; Hyperbolic Discounting ; Repeated Decision Problems ; Spieltheorie ; Zeitpräferenz ; Entscheidungstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Vieille, Nicolas ; Weibull, Jörgen W.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94683
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET