- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
CEPA Discussion Papers ; 75
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Potsdam
- (wer)
-
Universität Potsdam
- (wann)
-
2024
- Urheber
- DOI
-
10.25932/publishup-63180
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-631800
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
19.08.2028, 08:02 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Andres, Maximilian
- Universität Potsdam
Entstanden
- 2024
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