Aufsatzsammlung | Hochschulschrift
Four essays on managerial incentives under reputational concerns
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Dimensions
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21 cm
- Extent
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XXIV, 120 S.
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Erscheinungsjahr auf der Haupttitels.: 1998
München, Univ., Diss., 1999
- Keyword
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Führungskräfte
Betriebswirtschaftliches Ziel
Theorie der Unternehmung
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Asymmetrische Information
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit
Reputation
Investitionsentscheidung
Leistungsanreiz
Lernprozess
Theorie
Agency-Theorie
Mathematisches Modell
Führungskraft
Unternehmensziel
Unternehmenstheorie
LEN-Modell
Asymmetrische Information
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit
Prestige
Investitionsentscheidung
Investitionspolitik
Investitionsplanung
Anreizsystem
Lernkurve
- Creator
- Table of contents
- Rights
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
11.03.2025, 12:24 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Aufsatzsammlung
- Hochschulschrift
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