Information acquisition and strategic disclosure in oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

I study the incentives of oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common demand intercept. Since firms may fail to acquire information even when they invest in information acquisition, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. Firms may earn higher expected profits under such a selective disclosure regime than under the regimes where firms commit to share all or no information. In particular, this holds under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, if the firms have sufficiently flat information acquisition cost functions. For steeper cost functions Cournot duopolists prefer strategic disclosure, if their goods are sufficiently differentiated.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2007,13

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
• Thema: oligopolistic competition ; information acquisition ; information sharing ; commitment ; common value ; product differentiation ; Informationsverhalten ; Informationsaustausch ; Oligopol ; Wettbewerb ; Produktdifferenzierung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jansen, Jos
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26928
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ