Arbeitspapier
Public Disclosure, Private Information Acquisition, and Complementarity: A Global-Games Approach
I study the effect of public information disclosure in a market setting where private information acquisition exhibits strategic complementarity. To overcome the issue of equilibrium multiplicity, I introduce heterogeneous information cost and imperfect information on the cost distribution. The resulting unique equilibrium features nonlinear responses to information disclosure. In particular, the classic \crowding-out" result can be reversed and public disclosure \crowd in" more private information acquisition. This effect is most prominent when there is high uncertainty about economic fundamental. The theory predicts that public disclosure of intermediate precision (neither too precise nor too vague) is most effective in stimulating private information acquisition.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2020-05
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- Subject
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Information Disclosure
Information Acquisition
Dynamic complementarity
Global Games
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cai, Zhifeng
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Rutgers University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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New Brunswick, NJ
- (when)
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2020
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cai, Zhifeng
- Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2020
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Economic consequences of public disclosure
On Plaintiffs’ Strategic Information Acquisition and Disclosure during Discovery
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Acquisition and Disclosure of Information as a Hold-up Problem
Total Reward Semi-Markov Mean-Field Games with Complementarity Properties
Complementarity problems
Stochastic complementarity
Playing Multiple Complementarity Games Simultaneously
Information acquisition and strategic disclosure in oligopoly
Explaining Diversity: Symmetry-Breaking in Complementarity Games
Complementarity formulation of games with random payoffs
Economic consequences of public disclosure
On Plaintiffs’ Strategic Information Acquisition and Disclosure during Discovery
Complementarity
Complementarity
Acquisition and Disclosure of Information as a Hold-up Problem
Total Reward Semi-Markov Mean-Field Games with Complementarity Properties
Complementarity problems