Arbeitspapier
Acquisition and Disclosure of Information as a Hold-up Problem
The acquisition of information prior to sale gives rise to a hold-up situation quite naturally. Yet, while the bulk of the literature on the hold-up problem considers negotiations under symmetric information where cooperative short-cuts such as split the difference capture the outcome of bargaining, in the present setting, parties negotiate under asymmetric information where the outcome must be derived from a non-cooperative bargaining procedure. To avoid the difficult task of specifying and solving complicated games combining elements of signalling and screening, but to still compare incentives for acquiring information under voluntary versus mandatory disclosure, use of conditions such as incentive, disclosure and participation constraints only is made that are common to all non-cooperative bargaining outcomes.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 428
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Contract Law
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- Subject
-
mistake
information acquisition
disclosing information
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Schweizer, Urs
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
-
München
- (when)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17333
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17333-0
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schweizer, Urs
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2013
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Equity Stakes and Hold-up Problems
Hold-up-Probleme in der Umweltregulierung
Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?
Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
Organizational structure and the hold-up problem
On Plaintiffs’ Strategic Information Acquisition and Disclosure during Discovery
The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable investments
Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem
Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem
Public Disclosure, Private Information Acquisition, and Complementarity: A Global-Games Approach