Arbeitspapier
Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem
We study the role of competition for the hold-up problem in foreign direct investment in resource-based industries. The host country government is not only unable to commit not to expropriate investment ex post, but is also unable to commit to the provision of local resources. In the case of competition for local resources this dual commitment problem triggers higher investment levels and increases host country revenues, but hurts pro.ts of international investors.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6120
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements
Multinational Firms; International Business
Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
- Subject
-
foreign direct investment
natural resources
hold-up problem
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hefeker, Carsten
Kessing, Sebastian
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2016
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Kessing, Sebastian
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2016
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Rotation des Stimmrechts: Europäische Zentralbank
Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem
Real Exchange Rates, Structural Reforms and Monetary Union
Policy competition, imitation and coordination under uncertainty
Policy Competition, Imitation and Coordination under Uncertainty
Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union
Junckers Investitionsprogramm: EU-Kommission
Ende nicht in Sicht: Schuldenkrise in Europa
Federal Monetary Policy
Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime
Structural Reforms and the Enlargement of Monetary Union
A French plot to undermine monetary stability?