Arbeitspapier
Federal Monetary Policy
What is the optimal institutional structure for an independent central bank? The paper shows when it will be optimal for a country to have a central bank to be organized according to federal, purely national or a combination of both aspects. The analysis is then extended to a supranational monetary union and it is shown which organizational structure of a common central bank is optimal for participating countries and when they are willing to join. The implications for an enlargement of a monetary union are derived as well.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 422
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Monetary union
federalism
monetary policy
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hefeker, Carsten
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2001
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