Strategic information disclosure and competition for an imperfectly protected innovation

Arbeitspapier

The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms.profits and the probability of innovation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2009,6

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Organization of Production ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• Subject: externality ; free-rider effect ; information disclosure ; Innovation ; R&D ; competition ; spillovers ; strategic substitutes ; Innovationswettbewerb ; Duopol ; Industrielle Forschung ; Investition ; Informationsverhalten ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Immaterialgüterrechte ; Spillover-Effekt ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Jansen, Jos
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32198
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET