Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests

Arbeitspapier

In innovation contests, the progress of the competing firms in the innovation process is usually their private information. We analyze an innovation contest in which research firms have a stochastic technology to develop innovations at a fixed cost, but their progress is publicly announced. We make a comparison with the case of no information revelation: if the progress is disclosed, the expected profit of the firms is higher, but the expected profit of the sponsor is lower. Additionally, we show that firms may voluntarily reveal their information.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 16/2010

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Thema: Contest ; innovation ; information revelation ; Innovationswettbewerb ; Industrielle Forschung ; Informationsverhalten ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Rieck, Thomas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71890
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ