Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests

Arbeitspapier

In innovation contests, the progress of the competing firms in the innovation process is usually their private information. We analyze an innovation contest in which research firms have a stochastic technology to develop innovations at a fixed cost, but their progress is publicly announced. We make a comparison with the case of no information revelation: if the progress is disclosed, the expected profit of the firms is higher, but the expected profit of the sponsor is lower. Additionally, we show that firms may voluntarily reveal their information.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 16/2010

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: Contest ; innovation ; information revelation ; Innovationswettbewerb ; Industrielle Forschung ; Informationsverhalten ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Rieck, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71890
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET