Arbeitspapier

Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog reveals her type in an attempt to moderate the favorite while, similarly, the strongest type of the favorite tries to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. This strong-form disclosure principle is robust with respect to correlation, partitional evidence, randomized disclosures, sequential moves, and continuous type spaces. Moreover, the assumption of uniform asymmetry is not needed when incomplete information is one-sided. However, the principle breaks down when contestants are potentially too similar in strength, possess commitment power, or when information is unverifiable. In fact, cheap talk will always be ignored, even if mediated by a trustworthy third party.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 279

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Labor Discrimination
Subject
Asymmetric contests
Incomplete information
Disclosure
Strategic complements and substitutes
Dominance and defiance
Cheap talk

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ewerhart, Christian
Lareida, Julia
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2023

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-149332
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ewerhart, Christian
  • Lareida, Julia
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2023

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